The Challenges for Development Cooperation in Seeking a More Coherent Policy of International Migration
The migration issue has become one of the central themes in the fields of international relations and international cooperation for development over the past few decades. Evidence shows that globalisation (economic integration and liberalisation, advancements in information technology, in transportation, etc.) has accelerated the flow of migration. Since the 1990s, developed countries have received about one million migrants yearly. According to the Migration World Report 2005 (IOM), 192 million people, or about 3 percent of the world population, live outside their native country. These migrants constitute approximately 10 percent of the total population in OECD countries (Wets, 2004: 21). Today, the number of potential migrants is estimated at 10 percent of the population in developing countries, i.e. 500 million people. The scope of this migratory phenomenon is even more important if we include information relating to internal displacement and seasonal South-South migration.
Debates on migration are rich but few of them address the link between migration and development cooperation. The question of what the consequences of migration are on the development of both the origin and host countries has been largely ignored. The link between migration and development assistance institutions (national and multilateral) is usually not made. The attitude of aid donor countries towards the migration phenomenon is also ambiguous. This is not surprising given the heterogeneity in their migration policies, the complexity of their national interests and the sometimes controversial attitude of their native populations. The official discourse of development cooperation agencies when discussing migration issues is highly influenced by public opinion from the North as well.
In this context, there are a number of good reasons for re-examining the nexus between development cooperation and migration. The flow of labour is an incontrovertible incidence of globalisation. The low-development in emigrating countries is not necessarily the cause of migration. Migration does have some positive impact on both host and origin countries. Thanks to their strong negotiating position, development cooperation agencies are better suited than any others governmental and para-governmental agencies to exploit these positive impacts for the purpose of poverty reduction, development and prosperity.
The outlined context asks us to address some specific questions: Is brain drain the cause of persistent poverty in the South countries? Does development curb or encourage migration? What is the relationship between migration policy and aid policy? Should we urge for a more restrictive migration policy or a more coherent, broad-based and flexible one? Which mechanisms would allow migrants the possibility to return home, to contribute in the development process, and provide crisis relief for the aging Western population at the same time? What can we do to safeguard remittances and help the migrants to invest them more efficiently?
Our discussion of these complex issues will confirm the need to link aid policy with migration policy in a coherent manner. This discussion will also suggest a more effective use of the local people’s intelligence in development assistance institutions.
Migration and Poverty in South Countries
Half of the world, i.e. about three billion people, live on less than two dollars a day. Nearly one billion people entered the 21st century unable to read a book or sign their names. Some 1.1 billion people in developing countries have no access to running water, and 2.6 billion people lack basic sanitation. Approximately, 790 million people in the developing world are still chronically malnourished. According to UNICEF, 11 million children under five years of age die each year due to poverty. The GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of the poorest 48 nations (i.e. a quarter of the world’s countries) is less than the wealth of the world’s three richest people combined. In this world of inequality, people must migrate in the hope of finding a better life, as suggested by J.K. Galbraith, migration is “the oldest action against poverty” (IDC, 2004: 13).
Although Southern countries  are extremely under-developed, poverty is not always the only reason for migration. People living in Southern countries are very frequently left no choice but to migrate because of conflict, violence, corruption and the coercion of freedom. War and conflict are an every day experience for hundreds of millions of people living in the South. There are never less than 30 armed struggles happening in the world these have brought about the displacement of approximately 14.1 million people (UNHCR, 2007: 2).
Although links are sometimes made between the phenomenon of brain drain and lack of development  , migration is not necessarily harmful for developing countries. For poor countries, human capital, especially high-qualified labour, is always important. The loss of skilled members of the workforce constitutes a real threat for many developing countries. Despite this loss it is still unfounded to say the flow of labour has damaged the development process of these countries, jeopardizing their ability to achieve the MDGs. Countries with a high level of emigration are not the poorest countries in the world and regions with a high level of labour displacement are not the poorest regions in a country. Also, migrant families are not the poorest in a community. The premise that migration is not necessarily harmful to the poorest developing countries is supported by the IDC’s theory of the ‘migration hump’. The ‘migration hump’ describes the relationship between outward migration and the level of a country’s development by an inverse U shaped graph. At a very low level of development, there’s a low probability of migration. As development takes place and income levels rise, so too does migration. Migration will decrease once the income threshold level is reached (IDC, 2004: 21).
Moreover, many examples can be advanced to confirm the utility of migration to the development of South countries. The official total of remittances sent home by international migrants is estimated to be $93 billion per year; but, with the addition of unrecorded remittances, the total amount is expected to reach more than $300 billion (IFAD, 2007). While the global aid reaches its peak at only $103.7 billion (OECD-DAC, 2008), remittances constitute a key resource for financing the MDGs, because they not only improve the standard of living at household level, but they can sometimes be intended for community and social purposes as well (OECD, 2004: 9). Statistics show that on average, a 10 percent increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population will lead to a 1.9 percent decline in the share of people living on less than one dollar per person per day (Adams, Page, 2003: 2). Many studies show that beyond the transfer of funds, remittances constitute a point of entry for migrant communities to a variety of banking services and products, including access to savings, credit and insurance options with significant long-term benefits to migrants and their families (DFID, 2003: 13). For some countries, remittances are an important source to improve their foreign exchange reserves and to ensure their balance of payments.
In addition, the home countries of migrants can enjoy the transfer of technology, machines and management experience. Once migrants have returned home, they are considered an important source of new knowledge, skills and competencies. As a result, migration can bring about economic growth, business opportunities and help to accelerate the integration of emigration country into the world’s economy. Furthermore, migration encourages the motivation to invest in the education of children. We can also expect that the more freedom low-skilled labour is given to migrate to developed countries, the less of a difference there will be between the wages of the developed and developing world.
The Incoherent Migration Policy and the Ambiguous Dilemma of Donor Countries
Today, migration is considered as a problem inflicted by developing countries on Northern societies. The Western media stir up worry about a Chinanized, Turkeynized or Mexicanized world. The speed and mass of migratory flows concerns the leaders of developed countries. In truth, there is an increasing trend of labour flow from the South to the North. But, the fear of Western citizens that “barbarians” may be stealing their jobs, claiming “our home could be theirs”, weighing on Western social networks, etc., is far from reality. Although, the world migration population has risen more than double from 1965 to 2000, world migration in percentage is remaining quite constant at only around 3 percent. Furthermore, the developed world is less influenced by forced migration than by voluntary migration, which is generally more educated than forced migrants. Of their 100 million immigrants, there are only 3 million refugees (IDC, 2004: 20).
The worry of rich countries over migration issues manifests in the fact that they devote more and more time and money to prevent migration from the South, by border enforcement, massive deportation and attempts to curtail movement at the source by setting up joint task forces from sending and receiving countries (Diouf, 2004: 2). Paradoxically, in the meantime, they make more of an effort in encouraging and attracting high-skilled labour. This situation is possible because of “the effects of demand (increasingly selective immigration policies) and supply (significant demographic growth and education improvements in developing countries)” (Docquier, Sekkat, 2006).
Although migration scholars have started to call for a positive nexus between migration and the development of Southern countries and in spite of the market demands for a more deregulated labour control, public opinion of developed countries stays controversial. This attitude of Western populations has negatively influenced the coherence in the policies of development assistance agencies in general and of rich countries in particular.
In 1992, ILO and HCR jointly gave their support to the co-development discourse which argues that foreign aid is an efficient way to reduce migration because it solves the problem at its source.  Aid helps to reduce the migratory flow, releasing resources for development (Nair, 1997). Aid is considered compensation for remittances lost as a result of migrant return  or the interdiction of emigration.  However, the reality shows that aid-related migration is becoming more and more common. If an emigrant country does not respect its commitments on migration issues, a partial or full breaking of aid relation is expected to occur. Quantitative repartition of aid to each country is also allocated according to its migratory potentiality (Tran, 2004: 41). Migrant repatriation can also condition the decision of granting aid.
It may seem commonsensical that aid should be allocated to the poorest countries and poorest people. Conversely, aid is likely to go to countries with high migratory propensity. As previously shown by the migration hump theory, these countries are generally not the poorest in the world. Many examples can be evoked to demonstrate how incoherently aid policies of OECD countries are designed to prevent migration (or to bargain for migrant repatriation).
For instance, in 2002, the European Commission proposed to link EU development aid to the willingness of countries to readmit undocumented migrants. At an EU summit in 2002, the British and Spanish Prime Ministers proposed to no longer give aid to migrant sending countries that would not cooperate in containing undocumented immigration. In Morocco, European funds channeled through the MEDA (mesures d’accompagnement) aid programme aims mainly to reduce Moroccan migration to Europe. (cf. De Haas, 2006: 3, 15).
OECD’s development assistance statistics show that a number of their members generally allocate aid to neighbouring developing countries. France, for example, considers that migration is a key challenge for France and its overseas territories. It finds that to control migration flow, it requires the economic development, as well as the improvement of living and sanitary conditions in the countries of origin (AFD, 2006: 57). To avoid a probable migration from some 20 African countries to French territory, France “will devote at least 80 percent of its grants and 60 percent of its budgetary resources to sub-Saharan Africa (…), with priority to those in French-speaking Africa” (AFD, 2007: 46).
Likewise, the Australian Development Cooperation Agency emphasizes clearly that “our aid program… is also an expression of our own interests”, that “Australia’s peace and prosperity is linked to that of our neighbours, particularly in our immediate region. These links are becoming deeper and broader, from both security and economic perspectives” (Ausaid, 2006: 5). Consequently, Australian aid is located in the priority areas of Indonesia, the Philippines, East Timor and the Mekong, where most of Australia’s immigrants come from.
The Czech Republic, like Australia, has similar foreign policy interests; in its Top 10 aid recipients during the period 2000-2005 are, to name but a few: Ukraine, Romania, Moldova, Georgia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro (MZV, 2006:78). These countries are evidently not the poorest in the world, but have a more probable trend to migrate into the Czech Republic, and therefore, a large amount of Czech aid has been given to these countries for migration projects.
These examples of linking aid to migration could be considered as a case of negative aid conditionality. Criteria and conditions imposed by donor countries on receiving countries are not efficient in obstructing migration. The fact is that the aid-related migration policy implemented by some countries cannot reduce the migratory flows to their territories. People from the Southern countries that receive the most aid have a net trend to migrate to developed countries, because of the geographical proximity, linguistic similarity and historico-cultural affinity, etc. Furthermore, aid cannot compensate for remittances gained from migration. It’s estimated that remittances (both through formal and informal channels) are 3 times higher than the amount of aid donated to impoverished countries. While aid shows signs of a slowdown because of aid fatigue syndrome, remittances are expected to rise exponentially as globalisation fuels migration.
The intentions behind this aid-related migration conditionality are more than clear: to attract only highly qualified immigrant from developing countries and to block their borders to low-qualified labour or to refugees.  One ironical example to illustrate this ambiguity in aid-related migration policy, are its scholarship programmes offered to scholars from developing countries. These scholarships account for a large part in the total of development aid. However, these researchers often do not return to their countries of origin and end up being a resource in the developed country. A survey of Ph.D. students showed that 79 percent of students from India and 88 percent from China who arrived in the US in 1990-91 still stayed there after finishing their studies (OECD, 2004: 10). One can question the good intention of the Western countries by asking the following: Are developed countries using migration policy for their own interests and not for the cause of poverty reduction and for the benefit of the developing world?
The Role of Migration in the Development of Host Countries: A More Deregulated Migration Policy for Low-Skilled Labour as a Solution
Scholars of migration admit, “the links between migration and development, as well as migration’s consequences on countries of origin remain rather unclear” (AFD, 2007: 71). However, according to us, the link between immigrants and the development of host societies is even more obscure. Migration might create problems for receiving countries such as: cultural assimilation, dependence on foreign human resources, social welfare burden etc. Also, the rate of undocumented entry in developed economies of the West is increasing steadily (Diouf, 2004: 2). This situation has fuelled anti-migrant sentiments all over the more wealthy countries; from USA, Western Europe, to Australia. Negative reactions in recipient countries are particularly high over issues of unemployment, unsecured working conditions, and low-wage, which are all at times attributed to the fault of migration. However, these fears and reactions are often amplified, speculative and emotional rather than based on actual facts. It may well be the case that many more people would like to migrate, but there is currently – in contrast to the impression given by the media- – no “tidal wave” about to crash on the shores of the developed world – as International Development Cooperation has specified in its recent report to the House of Commons (IDC, 2006: 15).
In fact, migration can contribute positively to the recipient economies. In the context of liberalization, globalization, lack of high-competent human capital and aging population, migration is becoming an unavoidable trend. Western countries cannot solve migration crisis only by increasing border control or tightening up regulations, but instead they need to anticipate more migratory flows in the future (West, 2004: 21). Moreover, developed countries have their own interests in migration flows. The grey matter of migrants is becoming necessary for numerous sectors in the more wealthy countries. They have yielded a high value-added to the host economies. Paradoxically, their remuneration is always disproportionate to their contribution, because of the discrimination in salary. For example, the average weekly wage of a foreign-born construction worker is $563, or about 30 percent less than the average wage for the U.S.-born construction worker  . As a result, migration creates cheaper commodities for consumers and increased production. Immigration can also have a positive impact on demographics of OECD countries  , “where the average population is getting older, by decreasing the average age of the recipient population and increasing fertility rates (because immigrants are generally younger)” (OECD, 2004: 12).
According to the ILO Executive Director, Kari Tapiola, “The modern society feels the demand for migrants… Their number will continue to increase, and our task is to make the migration process more socially and economically favourable” (Tapiola, 2006). In fact, migration greatly benefits the development of both rich and poor countries. However, determining how to share equitably the benefits of migration in terms of development between home and host societies is far from easy (Martin, 2003). There is one possible role in which international cooperation for development can contribute to enhance “migration equity” outcomes: it can ask for less restrictive entry for humanitarian migration (i.e. familial reunification, refugee’s asylum), and a more transparent migration procedure for low-skilled labour and a more regulated high-skilled labour.
The reality shows that better-educated migrants are better established and wealthier than refugees and less educated migrants. They are often permitted to bring their families with them (Sriskandarajah, 2005:13). They have more capabilities and motivation to integrate in socio-political activities in their host countries. Their adaptation to the new societies is successful because they are less stigmatized and discriminated against. As a result, their establishment in host countries is likely permanent.
In contrast, refugees and low-skilled labourers migrate with the intention of returning to their homeland after some years. Many studies show that a large majority of low-skilled migrants ultimately do go back home. They are likely more temporary than high-skilled labour. Moreover, rich countries are also in need of low-qualified labour. The relaxation of restrictions on this unskilled group will have advantageous returns on capital and the overall welfare of developed economies. It will spread positive effects on production and on real GDP  (Walmsley et al., 2002: 3). It will reduce the pressure of the manual sector, which is currently in acute crisis due to the reduction in able-bodied population and low wages in developed countries.
Besides high-skilled labour attraction programmes, these countries should open their labour markets to the possibility of an organised manual immigrant labour programme. They should renounce the approach that concentrates on threats and offer people legal migration channels (Kehys, 2006: 10). Their somewhat hypocritical and ambiguous standpoint is neither good for their own interests, nor for the development of Southern countries because it encourages illegal migration, which only benefits mafia gangmasters. Recognizing the need for less qualified labour will help to attack more efficiently human trafficking, smuggling and forced labour. And, the final outcome of this policy will be advantageous for both developed and developing countries.
Once manual labour flow to the North countries is legalized, migration can become less permanent and more circular because documented entry will help migrants to go back home more easily and send remittances to their family through official channels.  Documented low-skilled labour will help them to gain access to social and financial services in host countries (i.e. insurance, health care, banking account, savings account, etc). This measure will also help to reduce the public resistance to all forms of migration, which leads to the exploitation of vulnerable people. Furthermore, the cost of migration will also be reduced because of the transparency in the migration procedure. Studies of migrants also reveal that unlike high-skilled labour, low-skilled labour is likely to have stronger attachments to their home countries (Sriskandarajah : 2005, Faini : 2003). They have more of an « obligation » towards their home family than high-skilled labour. We can also expect that one dollar sent by low skilled labour has more poverty reduction effects than one sent by high skilled labour because skilled workers are likely to come from relative wealthy families. 
A reality like this can help to redefine the role of development cooperation agencies. They would be able to work jointly with OECD countries to build a coherent international migration regime. On the one hand, this regime must permit less restrictive entry for low skilled labour from the South. On the other hand, this regime must aim to discourage the high-skilled labour flow. Rich countries should not aggravate brain drain from poor countries. Development cooperation agencies can also support host countries in easing the living and working conditions of low-skilled migrants. They can help migrants claim rights (i.e., wages, social protection and other socio-political rights) equivalent to those enjoyed by native citizens of host countries. Their help is very important because “for reasons of low human capital or racial stereotypes, an immigrant group finds itself discriminated against, there is every reason to expect that it will band together and adopt a defensive stance toward the host country” (Portes et al., 2005: 18). And, this immigrant attitude will be detrimental for host societies.
In the case of highly-skilled migrants, development agencies can be helpful in identifying the mechanisms, which permit them to deploy the best of their competencies. It is not speculative to say that highly-skilled workers want to contribute to the development of their home countries. However, they are afraid to lose their freedom to come back to work in developed countries. The salary difference is only a small problem for highly-educated labour. For them, as intellectuals, they need opportunities to develop their capacities, and to exchange their knowledge  . Making contributions to their homeland is an issue for migrants, but resettling in their homelands is another issue entirely. Development cooperation can play a huge role here by facilitating their mobility and enabling them to move back and forth.
The Challenge of Development Cooperation Towards a More Coherent International Migration Policy
It would be naďve to say enhancing coherence is simply a matter of allowing more or less migration. A coherent policy for poverty reduction and the development of the South requires a harmonization of objectives between different national policies of developed countries. All of us know that national policies of developed countries can have impacts on other developing countries (IDC, 2004: 15). Migration is a case of national policy which has global repercussions. A coherent international migration policy needs to cooperate with development assistance policy. However, the policy coherence in migration for the purpose of development still does not occupy a high enough position in the scale of priority of national policies. Numerous reasons could be named, for example: the political will on this issue is still weak.  The institutional framework and policy process is also complex because of differently implicated interests and institutions. Last but not least, the hostile sentiments of native citizens in the developed countries of the West largely affect the policy choice.
This lack of coherence between aid policy and migration policy may have a negative impact on the likelihood of achieving the MDGs. As argued in previous sections, the contradictions in the migration policy of donor countries is harmful for developing countries to different extents: loss of high-competence labour, high cost of migration, and the high cost of sending remittances, etc. Development institutions are now aware of the necessity of tak into account the migration phenomenon in their policies; and that “migration relates to many other issues including security concerns, HIV/AIDS, environmental degradation, international trade, agricultural subsidies, gender inequality and arms exports. Policies, which seek to manage migration, will have impacts in other areas and vice versa. Governments – individually and collectively – must do more to ensure that policies on related issues are coherent and support development goals” (IDC, 2004: 5).
In an increasingly interdependent world, the coherence in the policies of donor countries and development cooperation institutions is in the mutual interest of both host and origin countries. Nevertheless, these actors are still passive over issues of migration and development. The MDGs were silent over migration issues. Development assistance is still not working effectively in the case of migration issues, migration is not being used to its full potential to fulfil the internationally agreed MDGs.
Migration is a realm in which there is a great need for international cooperation in order to enhance its coherence for the achievement of development goals. Firstly, development cooperation institutions – due to their negotiation position with developed countries – can help to build an international migration policy that is more clear and transparent. A multilateral migration regime will make it possible for people from the Third World to have the same mobility level as people from the First World. This regime will help migration become a more circular process.
Secondly, development assistance agencies need to give priority to and enlarge their activities in poorest areas of the world with more targeted projects. We are aware that economic disparities, war and violence are some of the major causes of migration. Development cooperation has a lot of work to do in the fields of conflict prevention, conflict resolution, combating disease, combating of backward customs, e.g. female circumcision, poverty reduction and the eradication of illiteracy. “A greater commitment is required to foster comprehensive development strategies which are sustainable, people centred and include an emphasis on education, health and political participation” (Rindocks, 2007: 10). International development assistance needs to acknowledge that migration is not a South-North phenomenon. Most migration, especially of the poor, occurs within the developing world, but still these migrants are generally undocumented and unrecorded. These migrants suffer most from displacement situations and are most in need of development aid. Therefore, the development agencies have a sine qua non role in improving the livelihood strategies for these migrants.
Thirdly, development cooperation needs to advocate for organised low-skilled migration from the South to the North and at the same time it needs to contribute to avoid the brain drain from the South to the North. The best way they can do this is to use the locals’ intelligence effectively in their agencies based in South. They can encourage high-skilled workers to come back to their homeland and work for them. Brain drain is harmful for the development of poor countries. Ironically, hundreds of thousands of African graduates leave their continent each year to earn their wage in Europe and North America. At the same time, there are a similar number of consultants, experts and paid benevolents flying to Africa to work. We do not need to compare the cost of Western consultants to one of a qualified local consultant. By using efficiently these human resources, development cooperation agencies can keep high-skilled labour migrating to more developed countries.
Finally, development cooperation can help South countries to improve their financial infrastructures. It can help them to remove obstacles to the remittance flow, to broaden relevant financial products and services, such as savings plans and investment options (Sander, Maimbo, 2003: 1). Currently the inadequate financial infrastructure might affect negatively the flow of remittances, narrow the options for use and the investment of funds. Lacking access to formal transfer services will exaggerate the cost of remittances, consequently benefiting the criminal world. Development cooperation can also consider the possibility of establishing a partnership with diasporas to boost the remittance impact on development.
Our paper focuses on the links between migration and the role of development assistance agencies (both national and international levels). Arguing that diasporas and their remittances are an important development resource, it highlights the need to put into place policies to maximize the benefit of migration, and minimize its curse on the development of both sending and host countries. The development of cooperation between development agencies and immigrant policy makers can play a great role in this field. It can be advanced in many ways: through the promotion of a more coherent migration policy, through the mechanisms facilitating remittance transfers, the advocacy of a multilateral migration regime permitting circular movement of labour, and through the improvement of the survival strategies for people in internal and international displacement, etc.
I do not intend to advocate unilaterally for the South-North migration. Nor do I attribute all responsibilities of fighting against poverty in the developing world to developed countries and to development assistance agencies. I suggest that migration has positive effects and at the same time, negative effects on the development process of Southern countries. I agree that “migration is not a panacea for development problems, but properly managed it can deliver major benefits in terms of development and poverty reduction” (IDC, 2004: 3). Still, I find that development cooperation agencies are best positioned to maximize good effects and minimize the bad ones. So far, there have been few studies on this trade-off between development cooperation and migration issues. My study aims at making a small contribution toward filling this knowledge gap in order to strengthen the coherence in development cooperation policy for the purpose of poverty reduction and the development of South countries.
The article is a part of the project “Bringing Awareness of Development Issues Into Regions” supported by the European Commission.
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 The term „Southern countries“ is used in this paper to imply the least developed countries in the World, excluding all emerging countries such as China, India, Mexico, Argentina, South Africa etc.
 As example, many financial resources are necessary to migrate, which instead could be used for the purpose of development.
 One decade ago, the former Danish Prime Minister Rasmussen used the threat of immigration as an argument to increase foreign aid: “if you don’t help the Third world ... then you will have these poor people in our society” (Migration News, 1995).
 Pro-development lobbies in OECD countries must mobilize themselves and compensation (political or economic) must be generated for those who stand to lose from changes (Dayton-Johnson and al., 2006: 24).
 European Ministers for Development Cooperation requested the European Commission to investigate the possibility of using development aid to diminish migration pressures, (De Haas, 2006: 15).
 The migration of the highly educated and the highly-skilled grew exponentially everywhere in developed countries – by as much as 35 percent annually in the UK, 14 percent and 6 percent in Canada. (Abella, 2001: 1).
 In the absence of migration, the EU15’s population would decline by 10 million during the next two decades (Katseli, 2006: 12).
 According to these authors, the benefits from skilled labour movements are felt primarily in specific service sectors.
 As explained by DIOUF, “because of the tightening of border controls, the chance of return migration is decreasing… (Undocumented people) are not planning to go back home because they are reluctant to face again the costs and risks of crossing borders. Rather, they are staying longer and arranging for the entry of family members”.
 OECD found that remittances are often targeted on the poor as migrants who come from poorer families have a higher propensity to send money home than migrants from well-off families (OECD, 2004:9).
 Lecture given by Professor Mamadou Diouf on 2 March 2004, http://www.rawoo.nl/pdf/Professor%20Mamadou%20Diouf%20Migration%20and%20Development%20Cooperation.pdf.
 By May 2004, only 25 countries had ratified the UN Convention 1990 on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and their Families. Most of the countries which have ratified are migrant–sending countries; so far no major country of destination has ratified the Convention (Pierce, 2004: 43).
Quynh Thu Tran studied International Studies and International Economics and is currently a research fellow and a PhD candidate in Development Studies at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva. Her research interests are inequality, development assistance, democratization and migration. She can be contacted at thuquynhtran(AT)graduate.org.